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Capitano: Age Discrimination and Police Employment Practices

NOTE

AGE DISCRIMINATION AND POLICE
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
I.

INTRODUCTION

To protect the safety and welfare of the public, police officers

are given a great deal of individual discretion; they have the right to
use force and to kill if necessary.1 Police officers are also required to

engage in strenuous physical activity and to react quickly under
pressure. In the course of a day police officers may be required to

perform any of the following activities: pursuing, chasing, subduing,
apprehending and restraining suspects; breaking up fights; gaining
entry through locked doors and windows; controlling crowds; di-

recting traffic; high-speed driving; lifting and carrying heavy objects;
walking "a beat" for long hours, often in adverse weather conditions.2 In addition, officers must have good eye-hand coordination
and manual dexterity to fire their weapons. Such attributes and du-

ties may vary in importance because of geographic, demographic,
and societal differences.' Police officers are, however, instrumental in
keeping law and order in many crises, no matter what the situation

or location. Police officers must, therefore, remain both physically
and mentally fit throughout their careers.
1. Police officers, although given a great deal of discretion, must nevertheless act within
certain constitutional and statutory guidelines. A discussion of these constitutional and statutory guidelines is outside the scope of this note. See generally, K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION
(1975).
2. See, e.g., EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 248 F.2d 447, 451 (8th Cir.
1984).
3. Clearly a police officer working in New York City will be subject to more high pressure situations which require quick thinking and strenuous activity, than will a police officer
working in a small, rural, Mid-West town. See Nelson, Age Discriminationin Police Employment, 9 J. OF POLICE SC. AND AD. 428, 434 (1981).
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Many states have set mandatory entry level age limits for becoming police officers in order to achieve a physically and mentally
fit police force. 4 These states justify such provisions and regulations
by claiming that younger officers are easier to train, more physically
fit, more motivated and, therefore, better able to handle the job.5
Many states also set a mandatory age at which the police officers

must retire.6 The states justification for a mandatory retirement age
is that as police officers age, their physical condition and reaction
time decline-and in the interest of public safety, older officers are
7
replaced by a younger police force.
Applicants who failed to obtain appointments as police officers
because they did not meet the entry level age requirements have
brought actions against cities, counties and states which allege that
the entry-level age limits violate the fourteenth amendment's equal

protection clause8 and/or the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) . Police officers who were forced to retire under

mandatory retirement provisions have brought similar actions, alleging similar violations. 10
Only a few courts have considered the issue of minimum and
maximum age requirements as they relate to police officers." These
courts held that entry-level age limits and mandatory retirement do

not violate the equal protection clause.' 2 They may, however, violate
the ADEA when the applicant or retiree is over 40 and no Bona Fide
Occupational Qualification (BFOQ)1 3 is found to exist. 14 The court
4. Mandatory entry level age provisions require that candidates for the position of police
officer be at least the minimum age and not exceed the maximum age set by statute. For
example, in New York applicants must be at least twenty but not more than twenty-nine years
of age to qualify to become a police officer. N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 58(l)(a) (McKinney
1983). The maximum age generally ranges from twenty-nine to thirty-five. See, e.g., FLA.
STAT. § 112.043 (1982) (age 35); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23532 (Purdon Supp. 1986) (age
35); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1269m, § 13 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (age 36); W.VA. CODE
§ 8-14-12 (1984) (age 35). It is the maximum age limits, the age after which one can no
longer qualify to become a police officer, which are the subject of dispute.
5. See, e.g., Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 Supp. 939, 944 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), afd, 770
F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
6. See, e.g., CAL GOV'T CODE § 31662.6 (West 1968) (age 60); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
32, § 26(3)(a) (1966) (age 55); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 423.075 (1) (West Supp. 1986) (age 65);
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 23563 (Purdon 1957) (age 60); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 41.02(1 l)(a), (bb)
(West 1979) (age 55).
7. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982). See cases cited infra notes 29, 34 and 169.
10. See cases cited infra note 169.
11. See cases cited infra note 176-77.
12. See cases cited infra notes 29, 34 and 61.
13. Particular jobs or occupations require that persons holding those jobs possess certain
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decisions in this area are inconsistent. Some courts have held that
the entry level age limits and mandatory retirement age require-

ments were BFOQs, while other courts have found that such age
limits were not BFOQs.' 5 The Supreme Court has not decided this

issue, therefore, the inconsistencies remain.
This note will explore the case law in the area of age discrimi-

nation and law enforcement personnel. It will touch upon the equal
protection issue, but its primary focus will be on the ADEA issue.

The note will include a discussion of the purpose and goals of the
ADEA; elements and burdens of proof in an action under the
ADEA; and the standard of proof required to establish a BFOQ ex-

ception. Additionally, this note will examine some of the inconsistencies created by decisions in this area of the law, and will offer and
discuss some proposals for reform.

II.

EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o State shall
make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person . . .
equal protection of the laws." 16 Any state statute which violates this

amendment will be stricken as unconstitutional. 17 When a court subjects a state statute to a fourteenth amendment analysis, it will apply
either a "strict scrutiny" test or a "mere rationality" test. Strict
scrutiny is used when the statute affects a "suspect class"' 8 or a
"fundamental right."' 9 It requires that the regulation in question
skills. For example, a lifeguard must know how to swim; a longshoreman must be able to lift
heavy loads; and a bus driver must know how to drive. If a particular skill is necessary for the
performance of a particular job, that skill is known as a bona fide occupational qualification
("BFOQ").
14. See cases cited infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
15. Id.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I.
17. See generally NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 585-86

(West 1983).
18. Suspect classes are classifications based on race and national origin. See United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The Supreme Court has treated classifications based on gender, alienage and illegitimacy as semi-suspect classes, which are subject to a
review falling short of strict scrutiny, but something more than mere rationality. See Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (gender); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (alienage); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (illegitimacy).
19. There are two general classes of fundamental rights. The first is those rights independently guaranteed by constitutional provisions apart from the equal protection clause, for
example, the right of interstate migration. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
The second is those rights which are not independently and explicitly given by other constitutional provisions, but which are felt to be both important and implicitly granted by the Constitution. For example, the right to vote is a fundamental right. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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further a compelling state interest and that it (the state interest) be
advanced through the least restrictive means.2 Most statutes subject
to strict scrutiny are held unconstitutional.2
Because age is not a suspect class, 22 nor is the right to government employment a fundamental right,2 3 statutes which regulate the

hiring and retirement of police officers will be subject to the more
relaxed "mere rationality" standard. 4 The "mere rationality" standard requires only that the statute be rationally related to a legiti-

mate state interest.2 5 Courts are reluctant to overturn statutes which
are subject to this standard.2 6
Applicants who were denied employment as police officers because they were too old, and officers forced to retire, argue that the

state laws regulating entry level age requirements and mandatory
retirement deny them the opportunity for employment solely because

of their age and, therefore, denies them equal protection of the law.
Courts, however, have uniformly rejected this argument.2 8
A.

Entry level Age Limitations

Only a few courts have addressed whether entry level age requirements violate the equal protection clause. 29 In Hahn v. City of
20. See Note, Fullilove v. Klutznick: An Intial Victory for CongressionalAffirmative
Action, 8 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 377 (1981).
21. See Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine of a Changing Court: A
Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
22. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). The Court in
Murgia reasoned that:
while the treatment of the aged in this Nation has not been wholly free of discrimination, such persons, unlike, say, those who have been discriminated against on the
basis of race or national origin, have not experienced a "history of purposeful unequal treatment" or been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped
characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. . . . But even old age does not
define a "discrete and insular" group in need of "extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process." Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if
we live out our normal span ...
Id. at 313-14 (citations omitted).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See NOWAK, ROTUNDA AND YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 524
(1978).
27. See cases cited infra notes 29, 34 and 61.
28. Id.
29. See Doyle v. Suffolk County, 786 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1986); Hahn v. City of Buffalo,
596 F. Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); Colon v. City of New
York, 535 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977);
Ridaught v. Division of Fla. Hwy. Patrol, 314 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1975); Sobieralski v. City of
South Bend, Ind. App.
, 479 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
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Buffalo,30 a district court in New York held that section 58(1)(a) 3 1
of the New York State Civil Service Law did not violate the equal
protection clause. The plaintiff, in Hahn, also argued that section
58(l)(a) violated the ADEA.3 2 Section 58(1)(a) prohibits the appointment of any person as a police officer of a county, city, village

or town who is "less than twenty nor more than twenty-nine years of
age. . . . ,a The plaintiffs, in Hahn, were denied appointments as
police officers to the Buffalo Police Department because they were
over the age of 29.
In New York, prior to the Hahn case, courts decided cases chal-

lenging section 58(1)(a) summarily. 4 In Hahn, however, the plaintiffs pointed out two exceptions to section 58(1)(a)3 5 which sup-

ported their contention that section 58(1)(a) was not rationally
related to a legitimate state interest.3 6
One exception permits time spent in the military to be sub-

tracted from the age of the applicant up to six years. 37 This exception would consequently permit an applicant who spent time in the

military to be hired at age 35. The second exception permits the age
limit to be temporarily raised to thirty-five (35) when "aggravated
30. 596 F. Supp. 939, 944 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
31. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 58(l)(a) (McKinney 1983).
32. 596 F. Supp. at 944. For a discussion of the ADEA issue see infra notes 189-92 and
accompanying text.
33. See supra note 31. Section 58(1)(a) provides that
I. Notwithstahding any other provision of this law or any general, special or
local law to the contrary, no person shall be eligible for provisional or permanent
appointment in the competitive class of civil service as a police officer of the capital
police force of the state office of general services after June first, nineteen hundred
and seventy-eight, or as a police officer of any police force, or police department of
any county, city town, village, housing authority or police district unless he shall
satisfy the following basic requirements:
(a) he is not less than twenty nor more than twenty-nine years of age, provided,
however, that the time spent on military duty or on terminal leave, not exceeding a
total of six years, shall be subtracted from the age of any applicant who has passed
his twenty-ninth birthday as provided in subdivision ten-a of section two hundred
forty-three of the military law, and provided further, however that prior to June
thirtieth, nineteen hundred and seventy two, the maximum qualifying age provided
hereunder shall be determined as of the date when the applicant takes the written
examination.
34. See Tober v. Scofield, CIV-82-51T (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 29, 1983); Sica v. County of
Nassau, CIV-81-3497 (E.D.N.Y. March 9, 1982); Colon v. City of New York, 535 F. Supp.
1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), in which § 58(l)(a) was held constitutional; but see McMahn v. Barclay, 510 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (held to be unconstitutional).
35. 596 F. Supp. at 943.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 944; see supra note 33 for text of statute.
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recruitment difficulties" cause personnel shortages. a8 The court held
that the evidence presented in this case indicated that the number of
persons appointed under the military exception was relatively small
and that the second exception was an emergency provision.3
The court further held that these two exceptions were not inconsistent with the defendant's position that young officers are necessary
for the operation of a safe and efficient police department.40
The evidence presented at the trial showed that: (1) younger
officers were easier to train, were more highly motivated, and better
able to perform difficult assignments; (2) the average "street life" of
a police officer was ten years; and (3) physical capabilities tend to
decline somewhat after age 29.41 Based on this evidence, the Hahn
court held that this statute did not violate the equal protection clause
because it was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
maintaining an efficient and safe police force.42
The plaintiffs in the case of Colon v. City of New York" also
challenged section 58(1)(a) on the ground that it denied them equal
protection of the law because they were rejected for the position of
New York City Housing Authority police officer solely because they
were over 29 years. The City of New York, in support of section
58(1)(a), claimed that "the increase in public safety that is secured
38.

Id. Section 58(d)(i)(a) provides in pertinent part that:

I-a. Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision one of this section, upon request
of a municipal commission. . . , and upon a showing . . . that aggravated recruitthe state
ment difficulties are causing a serious shortage of police officers ....

commission may increase the maximum age to thirty-five years of age for a period
not exceeding two years from the date of such determination ...
N.Y. CIv. SERv. LAW § 58(d)(1)(a) (McKinney 1983).
39. 596 F. Supp. at 944.

40.

Id.

41.

Id.

42. Id. The court reasoned that the issue before the court was not whether the court
believed the facts and inferences which the defendant raised to justify the enactment of section
58(I)(a) were true. Rather, the question was whether such facts could "reasonably be con-

ceived to be true by the governmental decision maker." Id. (citing Vance v. Bradley 440 U.S.
93, 111 (1979)).
The court concluded that:
The facts upon which the age classification is apparently based are believable.
Taken as true, they would indicate that the age requirement of section 58(l)(a) is
rationally related to the goal of maintaining an efficient and safe police department.
Therefore, section 58(l)(a) does not deny the plaintiffs equal protection of the laws.
Id. at 949.
43. 535 F. Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The plaintiffs in Colon took and passed the
written examination for appointment to the New York City Housing Authority Police Department in 1973. At that time they were under the age of 29. Their names were not reached on
the eligibility list until 1979. The plaintiffs, however, were rejected because at this time they
were over 29.
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by fielding the most physically capable and active police force possi-

ble, and the administrative advantages of a younger police force
which include more years of service, lighter burden on disability and
pension systems, and more adaptability in new recruits" were legitimate state interests. 44 The State of New York cited similar interests. 45 Both defendant's therefore argued that the age limitation was
rationally related to these legitimate state interests.4 6 Subsequently,
the court held that it was constitutional to apply the rationality stan-

47
dard to section 58(l)(a).
In Doyle v. Suffolk County,48 and its companion case, Hettinger
v. Nassau County Civil Service Commission," the Second Circuit
Court upheld the district court's reasoning in Hahn.50 The Second

Circuit Court explained that although it is likely that many persons

above the age of 29 could perform adequately as police officers, the
legislature could rationally believe that the ability of an applicant to

perform the duties of a police officer will decline after 29 years. 51
The court held that once the decision was made to draw the line at

age 29, the decision was rational.52 The court reasoned further that
"ina case like this, 'perfection is by no means required' . Furthermore, "the legislature was entitled to consider the advantages of lim-

iting appointment to those more likely to remain physically able to
perform the duties of a police officer for a substantial period of
44. Id. at 1113.
45. Id. The State of New York intervened as a defendant for the limited purpose of
defending the constitutionality of section 58(1)(a). Id. at 1111. The State of New York cited
as legitimate state interests:
the extraordinary effort that police positions require, and administrative interests
which include more potential years of service; lighter economic demands on pension
and retirement systems, and facilitation of pension planning and management.
Id. at 113.
46. 535 F. Supp. at 1113.
47. Id.
48. 786 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1986).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 529.
51. Id. at 528. The court stated that:
the legislature could rationally conclude that individual physical testing of all those
29 and older would yield a proportionately smaller group of qualified candidates
than testing of those between 20 and 29. The legislature could therefore decide that
the limited financial resources of the state's communities would be best used if physical testing was undertaken only among the group most likely to yield qualified
candidates.
Id.
52. Id. "The obvious state interest sought to be advanced by the maximum age provision
is the recruitment of police personnel physically able to discharge their duties." Id.
53. Id. at 529 (citing Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 108 (1979) (quoting Phillips
Chem. Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960)).
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time. ' 54 The court also expressly addressed and dismissed the issue
of whether the exceptions to section 58(l)(a) render it irrational. 55
The Fourth Circuit Court addressed the equal protection issue
in Arritt v. Grisell.56 In Arritt, the court held that a West Virginia
statute, establishing a 35 year age limit for police officer applicants,
was constitutional.5" The court found that West Virginia had a legitimate interest in assuring that the police were physically fit and that
the 35 year age limit was rationally related to that interest. 58
The burden on a plaintiff asserting an equal protection claim is
heavy. The plaintiff must "convince the court that the legislative
facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decision
maker."5 9 This burden is not easily met because the defendant is
only required to show that the legislature, in enacting an age limitation for police officers, had a reasonable belief that the facts justifying such age limitations were true.60 Because these statutes are subject only to a mere rationality review, which is easily met since there
is a legitimate state interest in maintaining a young, efficient police
department, it is unlikely that entry-level age limit statutes will fall
on equal protection grounds.
B.

Mandatory Retirement

Since the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts Board of
Retirement v. Murgia,61 virtually all cases involving mandatory retirement ages for police officers are brought on the ground that they
violate the ADEA.62 In Murgia, the Court upheld a Massachusetts
statute which requires mandatory retirement for uniformed state police officers at the age of 50.63 The Massachusetts State Police re54. Id. The court reasoned that since mandatory retirement at age 50 had been upheld
in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976), New York could prohibit
appointment beyond age 29 with the hope of receiving 20 years of service before an officer

reaches 50. Id.
55. Id. at 529.
56. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977). State courts have also held that entry-level age provisions do not violate the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Ridaught v. Division of Fla. Highway Patrol, 314 So.2d 140 (Fla. 1975); Sobieralski v. City of South Bend, Ind. App. -,
479 N.E.2d 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
57. 567 F.2d at 1272.
58. Id.
59. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979).

60. Id.
61.

427 U.S. 307 (1976).

62. See cases cited infra notes 176-77.
63.

427 U.S. at 317.
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quired all police officers under the age of 40 to pass biennial comprehensive physical exams. Thereafter, officers were required to pass a
more rigorous annual exam until reaching the age of 50. Murgia, the
plaintiff, passed all the physical exams and was in excellent physical
and mental health. The Massachusetts Board of Retirement, nevertheless, retired him at the age of 50.
The Court found that the state had a legitimate interest to protect the public by assuring that state police officers could respond to
the demands of their job. 64 The Court reasoned that, although particular individuals over 50 years of age could perform the functions
of a police officer, the evidence presented clearly established that the
risk of cardio vascular failure and the effects of stress increased with
age.6 5 The Court, applying the mere rationality standard, found that
this statute was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.6 6
In light of the Murgia decision, it is unlikely that any state statute or policy on mandatory retirement will be stricken for violating
the equal protection clause. Such requirements, however, may nevertheless fail on ADEA grounds.67

III.

AGE DISCRIMINATION AND THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT ACT

In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),6 8 to protect persons between the ages of 40 and
65 from discrimination in employment. In 1986, the age limitation
was amended and the age ceiling was eliminated.69 The purpose of
the ADEA is "to promote employment of older persons based on
their ability rather than age; [and] to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment ....,,70 The ADEA is aimed at reducing
unemployment, welfare and waste which result from the under-utili64.

Id. at 314.

65. Id.
66.
67.
68.

Id. at 312.
See cases cited infra notes 176-77 and accompanying text.
Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-

634 (1982)).
69. Pub. L. No. 99-592, Stat. (1986) ("The prohibitions in this Act
[ADEA] . . .shall be limited to individuals who are at least forty years of age.").
70. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b)(1982), section 621(b) states:
It is therefore the purpose of this Act [29 USCS §§ 621 et seq;] to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.
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zation of experienced workers. 7 Additionally, the ADEA seeks to
alleviate the economic, psychological and health problems faced by
the victims of age discrimination. 2

Prior to 1974, the ADEA did not apply to state and local governments. 73 In 1974, Congress amended the ADEA's definition of
"employer" to include states and agencies and political subdivisions
of a state.74 This amendment was criticized and challenged as unconstitutional.7" Those challenging this amendment drew support
from the Supreme Court's decision in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 6 which invalidated the extension of the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) to state and local governments. The Court, in National
League of Cities, held that the commerce clause did not empower
Congress to enforce the provisions of the FLSA against states "in
areas of traditional governmental functions. 7 These challengers argued that the ADEA's extension to cover state and local govern-

ments was likewise an unlawful exercise of Congress' power under
the commerce clause because essential public safety decisions were a
traditional government function. 78 The courts, however, rejected this
argument. 9
71.

See EEOC v. Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. 1328, 1331 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
The enactment of ADEA, and the subsequent amendments, reflect a national
awareness of the injustice that age discrimination imposes upon "elderly" citizens.
Congressional testimony surrounding the passage of this statute suggests two central
purposes, to wit, the reduction of unemployment, welfare, and waste which accompanies the underutilization of experienced workers; and, the alleviation of economic,
psychological and health problems faced by the individual victims of discrimination.
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1982).
72. 519 F. Supp. at 1331.
73. Pub. L. No. 90-202 § 11,81 Stat. 605 (1967).
74. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (codified as amended in 29
U.S.C. § 630(b)(1982)).
75. See infra note 79 and accompanying text.
76. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), rev'd, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
77. Id. at 852.
78. See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1983);
See also infra note 79 and accompanying text.
79. See EEOC v. County of Calumet, 686 F.2d 1249, 1251-53 (7th Cir. 1982); EEOC v.
Elrod, 674 F.2d 601, 603-12 (7th Cir. 1982); Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1269-70 (4th
Cir. 1977); Bleakley v. Jekyll Island-State Park Auth., 536 F. Supp. 236, 240 (S.D. Ga.
1982); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Minneapolis,
537 F. Supp. 750, 756 (D. Minn. 1982); Kenny v. Valley County School Dist., 543 F.
Supp. 1194, 1196-99 (D. Mont. 1982); McCroan v. Bailey, 543 F. Supp. 1201, 1205-07 (S.D.
Ga. 1982); Adams v. James, 526 F. Supp. 80, 84 (M.D. Ala. 1981); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Bd., 508 F. Supp. 148 (E.D. Pa. 1981); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 526
F. Supp. 1135, 1137-38 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287,
1292 (D. Md. 1981), rev'd, 731 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Pennsylvania Liquor
Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051, 1052-53 (M.D. Pa. 1980); Marshall v. Delaware River & Bay
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In 1983, the Supreme Court, in EEOC v. Wyoming,8 0 held that
the ADEA's extension to state and local governments was a valid
exercise of Congress' power under the commerce clause. EEOC v.
Wyoming, involved a Wyoming statute that required game and fish
wardens who had law enforcement responsibilities to retire at age
55.81 The Court distinguished this case from National League of
Cities by stating that although the management of state parks is
clearly a traditional state function, the degree of intrusion into
States' rights was less serious than was the intrusion in National
League of Cities.82
The Court, in reaching its conclusion, relied on its decision in
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,
Inc.s3 The Court, in Hodel, stated that there are three requisites
which states must satisfy before they will receive immunity from the
legitimate exercise of federal authority to regulate commerce, under
the reasoning of National League of Cities."4
First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates
the "States as States." Second, the federal regulation must address
matters that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovreignty."
And third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions." 85
The Court further stated that even if these three requirements are
met, it does not mean that the challenge to Congressional action will
succeed. 86 There are situations when the federal interest advanced by
particular legislation will override the States' interest to be free from
87
federal interference.
In 1985, the Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,8 8 and held that
Auth., 471 F. Supp. 886, 891-92 (D. Del. 1979); Remmick v. Barnes County, 435 F. Supp.
914 (D.N.D. 1977); Aaron v. Davis, 424 F. Supp. 1238, 1239-41 (E.D. Ark. 1976); Usery v.
Board of Educ., 421 F. Supp. 718 (D. Utah 1976); contra Taylor v. Montana Dep't of Fish &
Game, 523 F. Supp. 514, 515 (D. Mont. 1981) (rejected Commerce Clause attack on ADEA).
80. 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 (1983).
81. Id. at 234-35.
82. Id. at 239.
83. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
84. Id. at 287.
85. Id. at 287-88 (citations omitted). In Hodel, the court found that these 3 requisites
were necessary to invalidate congressional commerce power under the reasoning of National
League of Cities. Id. at 287.
86. Id. at 288.
87. Id. at 290.
88. 469 U.S. 528, 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985). The court in Garcia reexamined the "tradi-
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Congress may validly extend the FLSA to state and local governments. It is now clear that state and local governments must abide
by the standards set forth in both the FLSA and the ADEA.
A. Standard of Proof Under the ADEA

Section 4(a) of the ADEA makes it unlawful to refuse to hire or
to discharge any individual because of age, or to otherwise discriminate because of age, in compensation, conditions or privileges of employment.8 9 Section 4(f)(1), however, allows an employer to discriminate on the basis of age, when age is a BFOQ reasonably necessary

to the normal operation of the particular business, or when the employer's decision is based upon reasonable factors other than age.90
The plaintiff, in an action under the ADEA, bears the initial
burden of proof to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination.91 A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination
by showing that: (1) he belongs to the protected class; (2) he applied
for or was qualified for a particular position; (3) the employer did
not hire him; and (4) the employer, instead hired a younger employee.9 2 The burden of production then shifts to the defendant (emtional governmental function standard" and found that it was unworkable and inconsistent
with the principles of federalism. The court reasoned that the federal political process effectively preserved the states' sovereign interests. Senators and congressmen, elected by popular
vote, will prevent laws from being enacted which will excessively interfere with states' rights.
The court further reasoned that "states sovereign interests, . . . are more properly protected
by procedural safeguards inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially
created limitations on federal power." Id. at 1018.
89. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)(1982), provides that:
It shall be unlawful for an employer
(a)(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age.
90. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1)(1982), provides in pertinent part that:
(f) It shall not be unlawful for an employer...
(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsection[s] (a) ...of this
section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to
the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based
on reasonable factors other than age.
91. See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. 1328, 1331-33 (W.D. Pa.
1981). The courts in analyzing burdens of proof in age discrimination cases have adopted the
standard of proof enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Although McDonnell Douglas involved a Title VII race discrimination case, this standard was
nevertheless adopted for use in age discrimination cases. See also Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569
F.2d 1231, 1239 (3d Cir. 1977).
92. This test was adopted from McDonnell Douglas, a Title VII race discrimination
case. The court in McDonnell Douglas, found that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving the
following elements:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
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ployer) to show that there was a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the defendant's decision. 93 If the employer meets his burden,

the plaintiff (employee) then must be given the opportunity to prove
by the preponderance of the evidence that the employer's reason was
merely a pretext. 94 If an employer should invoke the BFOQ excep-

tion in response to the prima facie case, the employer bears the 5burden of production and of persuasion, to prove age is a BFOQ.
1. Standard of Prooffor a BFOQ Defense

It is easy for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination in cases where a law enforcement agency refuses to
hire or forces the retirement of a police officer because the plaintiff

has reached the statutory age limit. In many instances, the employer
will concede that age was the basis for the decision. Therefore, it
becomes necessary for the law enforcement agency to defend its decision on the grounds that age is a BFOQ.
Usery v. Tamiami Travel Tours, Inc.96 formulated a two

pronged test which set the standard for when age will constitute a
BFOQ. The Tamiami test places the burden on the employer to

show that:
(1) that the BFOQ which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainants qualifications ....

411 U.S. at 802-05. See also EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. at 1331-32. The
courts that adopted this test stressed that it was not to be applied rigidly in age discrimination
cases. EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. at 1332. One court stated:
[W]e conclude that the operative principles behind McDonnel Douglas are applicable in age cases as in Title VII cases, but that the McDonnell Douglas formula...
does not set forth immutable guidelines for the decision of all discrimination cases.
Rather, it is applicable to a greater or lesser degree in varying circumstances; the
judge should understand its basis and apply it functionally as circumstances
warrant.
Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1010 (1st Cir. 1979).
93. There was some disagreement among the circuits as to what burden shifted to the
defendant. See generally Launote, The Age Discriminationin Employment Act of 1967, 90
HARV. L. REv. 380, 388-400 (1976). This disagreement, however, was resolved by the Supreme Court in Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). In Burdine, the Court reexamined the McDonnell Douglas test and found that the only burden of
production that shifts to a defendant is to rebut the presumption raised by the plaintiff's prima
facie case. 450 U.S. at 254.
94. See EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. at 1331.
95. See Houghton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 553 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1978).
96. 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976).
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essence of its business (here the operation of an efficient police department for the protection of the public), and (2) that the employer has reasonable cause, i.e., a factual basis for believing that
all or substantially all persons within the class . . . would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved,

to deal with persons over the
or that it is impossible or impractical
97
age limit on an individual basis.
In Arritt v. Grissel,98 the Fourth Circuit Court applied the Tamiami

test to cases involving age discrimination and law enforcement personnel. Since Arritt, a number of circuit and district courts have also
applied the Tamiami test to age discrimination cases involving police
officers.99 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has explicitly adopted
the Tamiami test in cases where an age based qualification is justified by considerations of safety. 100
Whether age is a BFOQ is a question of fact. 10 1 Courts applying the Tamiami standard to justifications and evidence offered in
defense of maximum hiring age and mandatory retirement provisions
for police officers as BFOQ's have reached different results.1 2
For a public employer to satisfy the first prong of the Tamiami
test, it must show that age is a "reasonably necessary" qualification

for the safe, efficient operation of a police department which can
protect the public.10 3 Police departments raise many justifications in
97. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d at 1271. This test is known as the Weeks-Diaz test. The
validity of the age restriction is examined under the Weeks prong, and the necessity of the
requirement to the operation of the employers business is examined under the Diaz prong.
Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
950 (1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.
1969). See also Usery v. Tamiami Travel Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 228 (5th Cir. 1976);
Nelson, supra note 3, at 435 n.2.
98. 567 F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977).
99. See Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Missouri State
Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 456 (8th Cir. 1984); Heiar v. Crawford, 746 F.2d 1190, 1197
(7th Cir. 1984); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir. 1984); EEOC v. County of
Allegheny, 705 F.2d 679, 681 (3d Cir. 1983); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d
1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d
1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp 977, 981 (D.N.J. 1985);
Kossman v. Calumet County, 600 F. Supp. 175, 177 (E.D. Wis. 1985); Popkins v. Zagel, 611
F. Supp. 809, 813 (C.D. Il. 1985); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1337 (M.D.
Pa. 1984), vacated, 768 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1985); Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F. Supp 144, 149
(D. Vt. 1984); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923, 925 (E.D. Pa. 1981); EEOC
v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. 1328, 1333 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
105 S.Ct. 2743 (1985).
U.S. -,
100. See Western Airlines v. Criswell, 101. See, e.g., Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D. Vt. 1984) (citing Air Line
Pilots Assoc. v. Transworld Airlines, 713 F.2d 940, 954 (2d Cir. 1983)).
102. See cases cited supra note 99, and accompanying text.
103. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977).
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defense of age limits for police officers, in both entry-level age and
mandatory retirement cases. One such justification is based on the
relationship between age and physical condition. 10 4 Employers assert

that police employment is a physically and mentally demanding job
which entails working long hours in adverse, high pressure circumstances. 10 5 Police departments also claim that older individuals lack
the physical and mental agility and the stamina required to be an

effective officer, because a person's physical and mental skills and
abilities decline with age. 106 Police departments, therefore, claim

that younger individuals are more physically and mentally capable of
being effective police officers. 10°

Subjective opinions that older officers do not handle the job as
well as younger officers are not sufficient evidence to prove that age
is a BFOQ.

08

General evidence on the debilitating effects of age 0 9

or the tendency of physical capabilities to decline with age is also not
sufficent evidence to make age a BFOQ."10 To give weight to such

opinions and evidence would lend credibility to "precisely the sterotypical thinking the ADEA was designed to prevent."" 1 Rather,
the effect of age on the ability to perform as a police officer must be
demonstrated by specific, objective, factual evidence." 2
104. See, e.g., EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th
Cir. 1984).
105. Id. at 1094-95. Justice Higginbotham stated in a concurring opinion:
the reality [is] that we accept the factual and legal validity of using age as a prediction of certain physical and agility skills, the inquiry being largely the correspondence between the specific age and the specific skill requirement, and we accept that
age does so in such a sufficiently efficient manner that its use is not necessarily
suspect.
Id. at 1097.
106. Id. at 1094-95.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1094.
109. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977, 980 (D.N.J. 1985). The court reasoned that "chronological age alone is a poor indicator of ability to perform a job." Id.(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-527, pt. 1,p. 2 (1977)).
110. See Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp 939, 948 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
111. Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 234 (5th Cir. 1976).
112. See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 449 (8th Cir. 1984);
EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (M.D. Pa. 1984), vacated, 768 F.2d 514 (5th
Cir. 1985); EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d at 1094; EEOC v.
County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1982)
"[T]o satisfy the BFOQ standard the Patrol has the burden of establishing (1) a
correlation between the age limitations in and the safe and efficient performance of
the Patrol's function . . . and (2) that it has a factual basis for believing either that
substantially all older uniformed patrol members are unable to perform their duties
safely and efficiently, or that some older Patrol members possess traits which preclude safe and efficient job performance and which cannot be particularly ascer-
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Bare assertions about the relationship between age and the ability to perform, without more, will not be sufficient to establish a
BFOQ. 13 A question still remains, however, of how much proof is
necessary to establish that age is a BFOQ. For example, in EEOC v.
University of Texas Health Science Center,"'4 the court found a doctor's testimony persuasive evidence that age was a BFOQ for hiring
police officers. The doctor testified, "'that there is a deterioration
both physiologically and psychologically which is contributable to
the process of aging' and that 'age statistically proved to be a prominent factor in one's individual physical condition.' "1-15 This testi-

mony was combined with the testimony of two police chiefs that
physical fitness is a very important aspect of police training and that
a street officer's effectiveness diminished considerably with age. Further support was given with the testimony of an industrial psychologist that supervisory skills, proficiency at pursuit driving, physical
agility and marksmanship declined as officers reached age forty.
Both testimonies were sufficient to satisfy the "reasonably necessary"
prong of Tamiami. 16
In Hahn v. City of Buffalo,11 7 however, the testimony of law
enforcement experts that older officers tend not to be selfstarters;
tend to recover from injuries less quickly; tend not to handle crisis
situations well; and are more likely to have to resort to the use of
deadly force than younger more physically fit officers was not sufficient to make age a BFOQ. 11a In light of conflicting testimony that
officers over the age of 40 are serving in police departments and doing competent work and that some officers in their forties and fifties
can out-perform officers in their twenties or thirties, the court held
that the city of Buffalo did not prove that age is a BFOQ for hiring
police officers.119
Case law does not resolve the issue of how much evidence or
proof is necessary to establish that age is a BFOQ for the hiring and
retirement of police officers. The cases do show, however, that at
least medical testimony concerning the effects of the aging process
tained other than through knowledge of the Patrol member's age."
EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d at 449 (citations omitted).
113. See EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980) (City
claimed reliance on the State Retirement Act).
114. 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. Id. at 1094.
116. Id. at 1095.
117. 596 F. Supp. 939 (W.D.N.Y.), af'd, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).

118.

596 F. Supp. at 946-47.

119.

Id. at 947.
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on the abilities of police officers to perform their duties, combined
with factual data on the relationship between age and ability to per-

form, should be introduced as evidence when arguing that age is a
20

BFOQ.1

Another justification raised by proponents of age limits for police officers is public safety. 121 Employers assert that because the oc-

cupation of police officer concerns public safety, this safety factor
should lighten the burden of establishing a BFOQ. 12 Virtually all
the courts hearing this issue have rejected it. 123 Safety considerations
are built into the first prong of the Tamiami test; that is, safety will
be considered in determining if age is a reasonably necessary qualifi-

cation to the operation of the business1 24 (the greater the likelihood
of the severity of harm, the more restrictive the job requirements
could be). 125
A third argument asserted by employers is that age should be a

per se BFOQ for police employment.

2

Employers base this argu-

ment on the fact that a court has held that the federal laws regulating entry level age limits' 2 7 and mandatory retirement provisions 128
120. See supra notes 107-118 and accompanying text.
121. See infra note 123.
122. See cases cited infra note 123.
123. See EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. at 981. The court in New Jersey reasoned
that "when an alleged BFOQ concerns the public safety, '[t]he uncertainity implicit in the
concept of managing safety risks always makes it reasonably necessary' to err on the side of
caution in a close case." See also EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710
F.2d 1091, 1097, (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373, 377 (9th
Cir. 1982); Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Arritt v. Grisell,
567 F.2d 1267. 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); contra Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 449 F. Supp.
859 (7th Cir. 1974). The court in Hodgson held that the employer who is engaged in inherently dangerous activities, or whose business is primarily safety related, need only show "a
minimal increase in risk of harm" to establish a BFOQ defense. Hodgson, 499 F. Supp. at
863. (This case involved a mandatory hiring age for bus drivers).
124. In Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 333 (9th Cir. 1982), the court stated that:
when safety is 'the essence' of the particular business, that factor obviously becomes
an important occupational consideration. Consequently, employers whose businesses
are safety related have less difficulty proving that age is a BFOQ. Nevertheless,
courts cannot assume, in the absence of any evidence as to its effects on safe performance, that age, per se constitutes a BFOQ.
Id. at 377.
125. Usery v. Tamiami Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. See Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Missouri State
Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d at 457; Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d 1190, 1198 (7th Cir.
1984); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir. 1983); Galvin v.
Vermont, 598 F. Supp. 144, 149 (D. Vt. 1984).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 3307(d) (1982) (age 35).
The head of any agency may, with the concurrence of such agent as the President may designate, determine and fix the minimum and maximum limits of age
within which an original appointment may be made to a position as a law enforce-
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for federal law enforcement officers do not violate the ADEA. 129 In
1978, Congress amended the ADEA and eliminated virtually all age
limits for federal employees, except those pertaining to federal
firefighters and law enforcement personnel.1 30 An argument has been
made that if Congress concluded that certain age limits were BFOQs
for federal law enforcement officers, then these same type of age lim13
its should apply to state police officers.
The Supreme Court in Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 a
case involving mandatory retirement for Maryland firefighters at age
55, explicitly rejected this argument. Other courts have also rejected
this argument. 3 3 The plaintiffs, in Johnson, six firefighters, challenged the City of Baltimore's provision that requires firefighting
personnel below the rank of lieutenant to retire at the age of 65. The
City of Baltimore, relying on a provision which requires federal
firefighters to retire at the age of 55, argued that because Congress
has set the retirement age at 55 for federal firefighters, as a matter
of law, age should constitute a per se BFOQ for all state and local
firefighters.13 4 The Court, after a review of the legislative history of
the federal provisions regulating mandatory retirement of firefighters
and law enforcement personnel, found that Congress never intended
the age requirements to constitute BFOQs. 35 Rather, "[t]he history
ment officer or firefighter, as defined by section 8331(20) and (21), respectively, of
this title.
Id.
128.

5 U.S.C. § 8335(b) (1982) (age 55).
A law enforcement officer or a firefighter who is otherwise eligible for immediate retirement under section 8336(c) of this title shall be separated from the service
on the last day of the month in which he becomes 55 years of age or completes 20
years of service if then over that age. The head of the agency, when in his judgment
the public interest so requires, may exempt such an employee from automatic separation under this subsection until that employee becomes 60 years of age. The employing office shall notify the employee in writing of the date of separation at least
60 days in advance thereof. Action to separate the employee is not effective, without
the consent of the employee, until the last day of the month in which the 60-day
notice expires.

Id.
129. Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
130. 29 U.S.C. § 631(b)(1982). The 1978 Amendments eliminated virtually all age limits on federal employemnt. The provisions relating to federal firefighter and law enforcement
personnel, however, remained in effect. Therefore, these federal employees are required to retire at the age of 55, despite the provisions of the ADEA. See Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore,
U.S. -,
105 S.Ct. 2717, 2719-20 (1985).
131. See EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1041.
132. U.S.
, 105 S. Ct. 2717 (1985).
133. See cases cited supra note 126.
134. U.S. at 105 S. Ct. at 2721.
135. Id. at -,
105 S. Ct. at 2723-26.
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demonstrates instead that Congress has acted to deal with the idiosyncratic problems of federal employment .... "13
Courts have also addressed the issue of whether the BFOQ
analysis should apply to the particular activities of a particular employee or category of employees, 3 7 or whether the analysis should
apply to the generic class of law enforcement officers.1 38 This issue
concerns the interpretation of the phrase "particular business" contained in the BFOQ exception.1 3 9 The courts are divided over this
issue.140 One line of reasoning is that Congress intended that employment decisions should be made based on the ability of the employee rather than his age. 41 A decision based on a generic class
would frustrate the purpose and goals of the ADEA. 142 Another line
143
of reasoning is that the plain meaning of the term should apply.
The argument for a plain meaning reading of the statute is, that if
Congress had intended BFOQs to apply to a particular occupation, it
would have used the word occupation in the statute. 144 The middle of
the road approach recognizes that in some instances specific occupations with different qualifications may exist in one business, and,
therefore, each situation must be examined to determine how the
BFOQ standard should apply.' 5 This is not true, however, for police
136. Id. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 2723.
137. See cases cited infra notes 141-46.
138. Id.
139. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f(1)(1982).
It shall not be unlawful for an employer, employment agency, or labor organization(1) to take any action otherwise prohibited under subsections (a), (b), (c), or
(e) of this section where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of the particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age, or where such practices involve
an employee in a workplace in a foreign country, and compliance with such subsections would cause such employer, or a corporation controlled by such employer, to
violate the laws of the country in which such workplace is located.
Id.
140. See cases cited infra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
141. EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d 1162 (8th Cir. 1982).
142. Id. In St. Paul, the court reasoned that:
[i]t would be inconsistent with the goal of ability-based decisions to allow a city to
retire a fire chief or a police chief who was completely able to fulfill the duties of
another position within the department, such as a fire captain or patrolman ...
We cannot believe that the ADEA was intended to allow a city to retire a police
dispatcher because that person is too old to serve on a SWAT team.
Id. at 1165-66.
143. EEOC v. City of Janesville, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 1258.
145. See Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596
F. Supp. 1333, 1343 (M.D. Pa. 1984). In Mahoney, the court reasoned that:
[a]lthough we can understand why courts have interpreted the statute differently,
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employment because the duties of a police officer must be taken as a
1 46

whole.

One final issue is whether an intent requirement should be read
into the Tamiami test. Plaintiffs can argue that the age limits are
arbitrary and were not chosen with the intent to insure that a person
has the ability to perform the job.14 The courts, however, have re-

jected this argument.' 48 These courts reason that age limits should
be analyzed based on the objective evidence presented
at trial, rather
149
than on the subjective motivation of the employer.
Under the second prong of the Tamiami test, the employer
must demonstrate one of two things; that all or substantially all of

the applicants or retirees over the particular age limit are unable to
safely and efficiently perform the duties of police officer, or that it is
impossible or impractical to deal with those persons on an individualized basis. 150 This prong can be satisfied using the objective medical
we think that our interpretation is faithful to the words-that 'occupational qualification' means more of a recognized and discrete vocation rather than a desk assignment for an employee subject to all the obligations and benefits of quasi-military
organization. We also feel, as indeed the district court conceded, that a contrary
interpretation, which permits a particularistic analysis of the actual duties performed to overcome an otherwise justified BFOQ for similarly classified employees,
would raise immeasurable problems of morale, administration, litigation and
adjudication.
738 F.2d at 39.
The First Circuit concluded that its approach, "[recognizing] the need to focus not only
on the 'particular business' but also on genuine and well recognized occupations within such
businesses," would prevent sweeping employees of distinct vocations and occupations into a
discriminated generic class. Id. at 42.
146. Mahoney, 738 F.2d at 39. The court stated:
[w]hen, however, a person signs up in a paramilitary uniformed force, where one is
subject to generally unrestricted reassignment and performance of the most strenuous duties in any emergency, and under goes the military training required of all
recruits, with the expectation of receiving special pension and disability benefits, we
would be loathe to equate particular "assignments", even if of long duration, to
"occupations".
Id.
147. EEOC v. University of Texas, 710 F.2d at 1096.
148. Id. See also Heiar v. Crawford County, 746 F.2d at 1201; Kossman v. Calumet
County, 600 F. Supp. at 177; EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. at 1344.
149. The Fifth Circuit Court in EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center
stated:
we think it wiser to interpret the test as requiring the defendant to demonstrate at
trial, with objective evidence, that the age qualification is justified, rather than looking at the subjective motivation originally behind the qualification. . . .We therefore interpret Tamiami's requirements for an age BFOQ as not inviting judicial
safaris into the overgrowth of human emotion and intent.
710 F.2d at 1091, 1096 (emphasis in original).
150. Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F.2d at 1271.
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and/or factual evidence produced to satisfy the first prong. 151 The
objective factual evidence introduced to satisfy the first prong of the
Tamiami test must, however, show that age has a significant impact
on a person's ability to perform. 152 Therefore, if the court finds that
age is a reasonably necessary factor for the safe, efficient operation
of the police department, then it follows that in most cases persons
over that age limit will not be able to safely and efficiently perform
the duties of a police officer. This argument does not lose merit just
because a police officer is permitted to work past the age limit once
he has been hired, because the experience gained from time spent on
the police force compensates for the decline of physical abilities with
153
age.
The second prong of the Tamiami test may be more difficult to
prove. Economic considerations may not be used to justify the nonfeasibility of individual testing because such economic considerations
"were among the targets of the Act (ADEA). 115 4 Because applicants
for the position of police officer are generally required to go through
individual physical testing, the notion that individual testing would
be too difficult is not valid. Rather, it must be shown that despite
individual testing, it would be difficult to determine whether a candidate of a certain age would perform the job efficiently and that the
results of the tests would be uncertain.155
2. Reasonable Factors Other Than Age
The second exception contained in section 4(f)(1) of the ADEA
permits an employer to refuse to hire or to discharge an employee if
the decision is based on "reasonable factors other than age.' 56 The
"reasonable factor" standard can not be given a precise definition or
scope. The reasonableness of the factors upon which an employment
decision is based will be determined on a case by case basis.157 The
purpose of the ADEA is not to require the employment of anyone
regardless of age, who may be otherwise unqualified.' 58 Age need not
be the sole reason for a discharge or refusal to hire to establish age
discrimination under the ADEA. 159 Rather, it need only be a "deter151. Id.
152. See supra notes 103-120 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d at 1043.

154. Id. at 1042; see also Galvin v. Vermont, 598 F. Supp. at 149.
155.
156.
157.
158
159.

Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 596 F. Supp. at 945.
See supra note 90.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(a) (1985).
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(b) (1985).
EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 519 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 705 F.2d
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minative factor" in the employer's decision. 160
The United States Secretary of Labor has listed various factors

which might support a defense under the "reasonable factor" exception."'1 Some of these factors include physical fitness if reasonably
679 (3d Cir. 1983).
160. 519 F. Supp. at 1335. See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(c) (1985).
161. See 29 C.F.R. § 860.103(0, which provides:
(f) Where the particular facts and circumstances in individual situations warrant such a conclusion, the following factors are among those which maybe recognized as supporting a differentiation based on reasonable factors other than age.
(l)(i) Physical fitness requirements based upon preemployment or periodic
physical examinations relating to minimum standards for employment: Provided,
however. That such standards are reasonably necessary for the specific work to be
performed and are uniformly applied to all applicants for the particular job category, regardless of age.
(ii) Thus, a differentiation based on a physical examination, but not one based
on age, may be recognized as reasonable in certain job situations which necessitate
stringent physical requirements due to inherent occupational factors such as the
safety of the individual employees or of other persons in their charge, or those occupations which by nature are particularly hazardous: For example, iron workers,
bridge builders, sandhogs, underwater demolition men and other similar job classifications which require rapid reflexes or a high degree of speed, coordination, dexterity, endurance or strength.
(iii) However, a claim for a differentiation will not be permitted on the basis of
an employer's assumption that every employee over a certain age in a particular
type of job usually becomes physically unable to perform the duties of that job. In
many instances, an individual at age 60 may be physically capable of performing
heavy-lifting on a job, where as another individual of age 30 may be physically
incapable of doing so.
(2) Evaluation factors such as quantity or quality of production or educational
level, would be acceptable for differentiation when, in the individual case, such factors are shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements and where the criteria or personnel policy establishing such factors are applied uniformly to all employees, regardless of age.
(g) The foregoing are intended only as examples of differentiations based on
reasonable factors other than age, and do not constitute a complete or exhaustive
list or limitation. It should always be kept in mind that even in situations where
experience has shown that most elderly persons do not have certain qualifications
which are essential to those who hold certain jobs, some may have them even though
they have attained the age of 60 or 64, and thus discrimination based on age is
forbidden.
(h) It should also be made clear that a general assertion that the average cost
of employing older workers as a group is higher than the average cost of employing
younger workers as a group will not be recognized as a differentiation under the
terms and provisions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory exceptions applies.
To classify or group employees solely on the basis of age for the purpose of comparing costs, or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the assumption that the age
factor alone may be used to justify a differentiation-an assumption plainly contrary to the terms of the Act and the purpose of Congress in enacting it. Differentials so based would serve only to perpetuate and promote the very discrimination at
which the Act is directed.
See also 29 C.F.R. § 860.104(b) and (c) (1985), which provides:
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necessary and uniformly applied; amount and quality of production;

educational levels if shown to have a valid relationship to job requirements and are uniformly applied; use of validated tests; and re-

fusal to hire relatives of current employees."6 2 Furthermore, the
courts have held that chronic tardiness, 163 an inability to do the

job,1 64 and the elimination of a position 6 " are reasonable factors
where an employee was within the protected age group.

The "reasonable factor" standard is difficult to prove in a case
which involves age discrimination of police officer applicants or retirees because age limits are set by statute, and thus, the employer will

make a decision based on age. It has been argued, however, that the
state statute mandate was a reasonable factor other than age.
16

courts have rejected this argument.

7 EEOC

6

The

v. Wyoming, held that

the ADEA does apply to state and local governments, and because
under the supremacy clause a state statute which conflicts with a

federal statute cannot stand, any reliance on the state statute cannot
(b) Employee testing. The use of a validated employee test is not, of itself, a
violation of the Act when such test is specifically related to the requirements of the
job, is fair and reasonable, is administered in good faith and without discrimination
on the basis of age, and is properly evaluated. A vital factor in employee testing as
it relates to the 40-65-age group protected by the statute is the "test-sophistication"
or "test-wiseness" of the individual. Younger persons, due to the tremendous increase in the use of tests in primary and secondary schools in recent years, may
generally have had more experience in test taking than older individuals and, consequently, where an employee test is used as the sole tool or the controlling factor in
the employee selection procedure, such younger persons may have an advantage
over older applicants who may have had considerable on-the-job experience but who
due to age, are further removed from their schooling. Therefore, situations in which
an employee test is used as the sole tool or the controlling factor in the employee
selection procedure will be carefully scrutinized to ensure that the test is for a permissible purpose and not for purposes prohibited by the statute.
(c) Refusal to hire relatives of current employees. There is no provision in the
Act which would prohibit an employer, employment agency, or labor organization
from refusing to hire individuals within the protected age group not because of their
age but because they are relatives of persons already employed by the firm or organization involved. Such a differentiation would appear to be based on "reasonable
factors other than age."
162. Id.
163. Brennan v. Reynolds & Co., 367 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. II. 1973).
164. Hinote v. Dworshak Dam Constructors, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 18892 (D.
Idaho 1973).
165. Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113 (8th Cir. 1977).
166. See EEOC v. Missouri State Hwy Patrol, 748 F.2d at 449-50; EEOC v. County of
Allegheny, 705 F.2d at 681; EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. at 1338. In Missouri, the
court reasoned that, "legislative determination [is] not entitled to a presumption of correctness,
but '[t]his is not to say that a legislative declaration is not entitled to considerable deference.'"
748 F.2d at 449 (citing EEOC v. City of St. Paul, 671 F.2d at 1167).
167. See cases cited supra note 166.
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justify employment discrimination." 8
B.

Inconsistencies Created by the Application of BFOQ
Standards

Only six circuits have heard the issue of whether entry-level age
limits violate the ADEA, or whether they constitute a BFOQ. 69 Of
these six, the Second, 170 Third"'7 and Ninth17 2 Circuits have held
that because no BFOQ was established, entry-level age limits violate
the ADEA. Despite these holdings, these courts stated that their de-

cisions would not preclude the government from attempting to establish age as a BFOQ for hiring police officers at another time and
with additional evidence. 173 The Fifth 74 and Eighth 17 5 Circuits held
that there was sufficient evidence to establish age as a BFOQ and,
therefore, no ADEA violation was found.
Only three circuits 76 and a number of district courts 7 7 have
had the opportunity to examine mandatory retirement provisions in
light of the ADEA. These courts have also reached inconsistent deci168. See EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d at 682; EEOC v. County of Santa
Barbara, 666 F.2d at 378.
169. Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d 679 (3d
Cir. 1983); EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir. 1981); Arritt v. Grisell, 567
F.2d 1267 (4th Cir. 1977) (remanded to district court for further findings of fact on issue of
BFOQ).
170. Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
171. EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1983).
172. EEOC v. County of Los Angeles, 706 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1983).
173. See, e.g., EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d at 681.
174. EEOC v. University of Texas Health Science Center, 710 F.2d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir.

1981).
175. EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir. 1984).
176. Heiar v. Crawford, 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984) (age 55 not a BFOQ for retirement); Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984) (age 50 a BFOQ for retirement);
EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1982) (age 60 not a BFOQ for
retirement).
177. EEOC v. New Jersey, 620 F. Supp. 977 (D.N.J. 1985) (involved application for
injunction enjoining defendant from retiring police officers at age 55; injunction denied because likely success on the merits that age 55 would be found to be a BFOQ); Kossman v.
Calumet County, 600 F. Supp. 175 (E.D. Wis. 1985) (age 55 not a BFOQ for retirement);
Popkins v. Zagel, 611 F. Supp. 809 (C.D. III. 1985) (age 60 is BFOQ for retirement); EEOC
v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, (M.D. Pa. 1984), vacated and remanded, 768 F.2d 514
(3d Cir. 1985) (district court found age 60 was BFOQ for retirement); EEOC v. City of
Minneapolis, 537 F. Supp. 750 (D. Minn. 1982) (age 65 not a BFOQ for retirement of police
captains); Beck v. Bourough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (age 60 BFOQ
for retirement); EEOC v. City of Janesville, 480 F. Supp. 1375 (W.D. Wis. 1979), rev'd and
remanded, 630 F.2d 1254 (7th Cir. 1980) (age 55 was not a BFOQ for retirement).
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sions.178 The First Circuit 178 has found that sufficient evidence was
presented at trial to establish a BFOQ. The Seventh 8 " and Ninth
Circuits,""" however, held to the contrary.
The question of whether a BFOQ exists is a question of fact, so
the decisions will turn on the amount of evidence produced at trial.
"It seems somewhat anomalous for the lawfulness of maximum age
limits on police hiring to depend on the particular evidence presented
at various court trials throughout the country."'8 2 It is paradoxical
that in Pennsylvania, age 35 is not a BFOQ for hiring police officers, 18a while in Missouri, age 32 is a BFOQ for hiring police officers,184 or that in Massachusetts, age 50 is a BFOQ for retirement
of police officers,1 85 while in Wisconsin, age 55 is not a BFOQ. 188
These decisions not only create inconsistencies among the states
but may create inconsistencies within a state.1 87 This may result because one county or local government produces more evidence than
another and, therefore, it would be possible to have established a
BFOQ in one location within a state and not in a different location
within that state based on the same exact state statute.
Furthermore, because maximum hiring age and mandatory retirement provisions can be challenged on both equal protection
grounds and ADEA grounds, a statute maybe constitutional, but
may nevertheless violate the ADEA. The most troubling decision in
this area has been that in Hahn v. City of Buffalo. 88 In Hahn, the
entry-level age limit of 29 was held constitutional, 8 9 yet as applied
to those over the age of 40 constituted a violation of the ADEA because the evidence was insufficient to establish age as a BFOQ. 9 °
Those persons between the ages of 29 and 40 had no standing to
challenge the statute on ADEA grounds because they did not fall
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

See cases cited supra notes 176-77.
Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).
Heiar v. Crawford, 746 F.2d at 1200.
EEOC v. County of Santa Barbara, 666 F.2d at 376.
Hahn v. City of Buffalo, 770 F.2d at 15.
See EEOC v. County of Allegheny, 705 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1983).
See EEOC v. Missouri State Highway Patrol, 748 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1984).
See Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1984).

186. See Heiar v. Crawford, 746 F.2d 1190 (7th Cir. 1984).
187. Compare EEOC v. Pennsylvania, 596 F. Supp. 1333, (M.D. Pa. 1984), vacated and

remanded, 768 F.2d 514 (3d Cir. 1985) (district court found age 60 was BFOQ for retirement) with Beck v. Borough of Manheim, 505 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (age 60 is a

BFOQ for retirement).
188. 770 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1985).
189. 596 F. Supp. 939, 944 (W.D.N.Y. 1984).
190. 770 F.2d at 16.
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within the protected age group.'' This decision effectively leaves
those 29 to 40 years old without redress power.
Under Hahn, a police department must hire applicants age 40
or more if the applicants are able to perform the job. The police
department, however, is under no obligation to hire those applicants
between the ages of 29 and 40, even though the police department
would probably prefer to hire these applicants (age 29-40) rather
than those applicants over the age of 40.192 The Second Circuit
Court in Doyle v. Suffolk County'9 3 and its companion case Hettinger v. Nassau County Civil Service Commission,194 specifically
addressed this issue. The court stated that when one portion of a
statute has been invalidated (in this case, section 58(l)(a) as applied
to those person over 40), whether the remaining portion should be
considered valid is a question of legislative intent.19 5 There is a presumption that the legislature would prefer the remaining portion to
continue in effect.' 96 The court held that the New York Legislature
had made its intent clear that it preferred that "those 29 and older
should not be appointed as police officers," by enacting section
58(1)(a). 97 Therefore, the court held that section 58(l)(a) as applied to those between the ages of 29 and 40 is still valid and would
bar any challenge from those applicants in the 29 to 40 age group. 9 8
Decisions such as this make little practical sense. Not only is
the result illogical, but it is also unfair, because it leaves one particular group of individuals (those 29 to 40) without redress power. It is
because of these inconsistencies that the purposes behind entry-level
age limits, mandatory retirement provisions and the ADEA should
be examined more closely in an attempt to formulate reforms which
would allow these statutes to exist harmoniously.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because of the inconsistent and anomalous results reached in
this area of the law, serious consideration should be given to balancing two competing interests present in the area of age discrimination
and law enforcement personnel. The first interest is that the states
need to have safe, effective and efficient police departments. The sec191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

596 F. Supp. at 954.
See cases cited infra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
786 F.2d 523 (2d Cir. 1986).
Id.
Id. at 527.
Id. at 528.
Id.
Id. at 529.
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ond interest is that of protecting individuals from age discrimination
in employment. To meet these two interests, some type of reform is
necessary.
One proposal for reform is to repeal all state statutes pertaining
to entry level age limits and mandatory retirement. This would be a
drastic reform because it would lift all age limitations on becoming
or remaining a police officer. Police departments would be required
to make a determination of an applicant or retiree's ability to perform the duties of a police officer on an individual basis rather than
on the basis of age. Consequently, the result of this reform would be
consistent with the purpose and goals of the ADEA because it would
prevent employment decisions from being made solely on the basis of
age.
An additional result of the repeal of statutory age limitations
would be an increase in the number of people applying for the position of police officer. Because no age limitation would be imposed,
police departments would need to revise their testing and screening
procedures for determining a candidate's fitness, other than on the
basis of age. This would include devising more extensive individualized medical testing as well as revising the physical agility exam, in
order to determine which candidates are most fit for the position of
police officer. This could, however, become burdensome on the state
because it would increase the cost of and the time spent in screening
candidates.
A second reform would be to have an administrative agency,
such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, set forth
guidelines for what an employer must prove and the amount of proof
necessary to establish age as a BFOQ for police officers. This would
remove some of the doubt concerning the quantum of proof necessary to prove a BFOQ because guidelines would be provided to police departments. Additionally, it may reduce the number of inconsistent decisions reached by the courts because the courts would have
a uniform guideline to judge individual police departments'
decisions.
Finally, the purpose and goals of the ADEA should be re-examined in light of the current status of the law in this area, and with
a recognition that police employment is a unique occupation. The
best reform would be for Congress to amend the ADEA to create a
statutory BFOQ for entry level age limits and retirement provisions
for police officers. Congress would have the best insight into reconciling the concerns of the states and the purpose of the ADEA. Since
Congress has set age limitations for federal law enforcement officers,
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with a recognition of the need for young physically fit officers, Congress assumably should be able to recognize the same needs of state
police departments. Alternatively, Congress could reduce the burden
of proof necessary to establish a BFOQ for police employment.
Unless and until some reform measures are taken, the status of
entry-level age limits and mandatory retirement provisions will remain at best uncertain.
Francesca Capitano
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